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Abstract 
In many empirical contingent valuation studies one finds that household size, i.e. the number of household members, is 
negatively correlated with stated household willingness to pay for the realization of environmental projects. This ob-
servation is rather puzzling because in larger households more people can benefit from an environmental improvement 
than in small households. Therefore, the overall benefit should be greater for larger households. A plausible explana-
tion could be that household budgets are tighter for large families than for smaller families with the same overall family 
income. The fact that larger families can afford only smaller willingness to pay statements in contingent valuation 
surveys than smaller families with the same income and the same preferences might have consequences for the alloca-
tion of public funds whenever the realization of an environmental project is made dependent on the outcome of a contin-
gent valuation study. This paper shows how the use of household equivalence scales for the assessment of environmental 
projects with the contingent valuation method can serve to reduce the discrimination of members of large families.  
Keywords: contingent valuation and household size, willingness to pay, environmental project, family income, valuation 
service, household equivalent scales. 
JEL Classification: D61, H43, Q51. 
Introduction © 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is one of 
the most popular methods for the economic appraisal 
of environmental projects. It aims at the assessment 
of the change in social welfare generated by public 
projects in monetary terms in order to decide if a 
project is worthwhile from a social welfare point of 
view or not. If two or more alternative public projects 
are under discussion the CVM can help to decide 
which of these projects should be realized and which 
should be dropped1. Since the benefits accruing from 
different public projects affect different groups of the 
population differently the outcome of a valuation 
study has not only consequences for the efficiency of 
public spending but also for the distribution of the 
ensuing benefits. This paper deals with the equity 
aspect of environmental valuation.  
The CVM is an interview-based direct valuation tech-
nique which aims at the assessment of people’s Hick-
sian Compensating Variation (HCV) for a public pro-
ject. The HCV is positive if an individual’s utility in-
creases as a consequence of the project in question, 
otherwise it is negative. For a utility increasing project 
it can be interpreted as a person’s maximum willing-
ness to pay (WTP) for the realization of this project. 
For the utility decreasing public project it can be inter-
preted as his/her willingness to accept compensation 
(WTA) for the utility loss he/she expects from the 
project. Much has been written about the theoretical 
deficiencies of the contingent valuation method (cf. e. 
g. Harrison, 2007; Mathews et al., 2004; Carson and 
                                                     
© Michael Ahlheim, Friedrich Schneider, 2013. 
1 Of course, there are other uses of environmental valuation studies, e.g. 
the assessment of damages to nature after environmental accidents (cf. 
Carson and Hanemann, 2005, p. 827ff) or the appraisal of the non-
market production of the agricultural sector as an assessment basis 
subsidies in the EU (cf. Ahlheim and Frör, 2003). 
Hanemann, 2005, p. 906ff; Bockstael and Freeman, 
2005; Diamond, 1996a, b; or Diamond and Hausman, 
1994, 2012). But this has not impaired the dominant 
position of the CVM among environmental valuation 
techniques and it still holds that it “is hard to overesti-
mate the central importance of contingent valuation to 
modern environmental economics” as Carson and 
Hanemann (2005, p. 826) put it, an opinion that is 
basically shared by Kling et al. (2012) and confirmed 
by Carson (2012).  
While the theoretical concept of individual welfare 
measurement aims at the assessment of changes in the 
wellbeing of single persons, practical CVM surveys 
deviate from this path of virtue in two decisive ways: 
(1) instead of assessing individual welfare changes in 
terms of people’s willingness to pay (for HCV > 0) or 
willingness to accept compensation (for HCV < 0) for 
a public project, in practical surveys typically the WTP 
or WTA of whole households instead of the single 
household members is assessed and (2) the amounts of 
willingness to pay or willingness to accept stated by 
the different households are aggregated over all 
households. This contradicts the rules of ordinal utility 
theory where a utility function is defined only up to a 
continuous and monotonically increasing transforma-
tion, so that no intensities of utility or of utility 
changes can be assessed and, therefore, no aggregation 
of utility levels or utility changes is allowed.  
The household perspective adopted in practical CVM 
surveys raises two kinds of aggregation problems, an 
intra-household and a trans-household aggregation 
problem. The intra-household aggregation problem 
refers to the question of how the individual preference 
orderings and, accordingly, the WTPs of the different 
members of a household can be aggregated to obtain 
one common household preference ordering or one 
common household WTP. The trans-household aggre-
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gation problem, on the other hand, refers to the ques-
tion of how the WTPs of different households should 
be aggregated to attain the overall “social WTP” for a 
public project or its social value. This trans-household 
aggregation problem is solved in most practical valua-
tion studies simply by multiplying the mean WTP 
assessed from a representative household sample by 
the number of all households affected by the project in 
question. Ideally (i.e. if the selected household sample 
is really representative) this procedure is equivalent to 
adding up the HCVs over all households. As a deci-
sion criterion regarding the social desirability of a 
certain public project the Hicks-Kaldor (1939) crite-
rion, which was originally defined for the sum of indi-
vidual HCVs, is applied to the sum of household 
WTPs in practical cost-benefit analyses. In this context 
it postulates that a positive sum of household HCVs 
signals a potential Pareto improvement, so that the 
project in question can be recommended for realiza-
tion. If the sum of all HCVs is negative the project 
should be rejected1. This shows that practical cost-
benefit analysis based on the Hicks-Kaldor criterion 
violates the rules of ordinal utility theory by aggregat-
ing utility on two levels: the level of the people living 
in the same household, and the level of different 
households which are all affected by the same public 
project.  
Our main concern here is, of course, not the fact that 
practical project appraisal techniques like the CVM 
contradict the pure doctrine of neoclassical welfare 
theory but, instead, we are worried that these tech-
niques when applied in practical valuation studies 
often lead to counterintuitive results. When projects 
causing environmental improvements are valued one 
would expect that the WTP for such projects increases 
with household size since in many-person households 
more people will benefit from that project than in sin-
gle-person households. Contrary to this hypothesis 
many empirical studies yield results where stated WTP 
decreases with household size (see e.g. Whitehead, 
1991; Whittington et al., 1992; McDaniels et al., 1992; 
Garrod and Willis, 1994; Johannesson et al., 1996; 
Chambers et al., 1998; Roschewitz, 1999; Hammit et 
al., 2001; Liu et al., 2003; Ahlheim et al., 2004; Dong 
et al., 2004; Aprahamian et al., 2007). Chambers et al. 
(1998, p.149) give the following explanation for their 
result of a negative influence of family size on WTP: 
“This result might be related to ability to pay; as family 
size increases, budgets tighten, and WTP falls”. Our 
analysis here will be focussed on this aspect of trans-
household aggregation since it has consequences for 
the distributional effects of public spending in the 
environmental sector. 
                                                     
1 Since not only the CVM but also most of the other environmental valuation 
methods use this kind of household-based aggregation the resulting plausibil-
ity problems are, of course, not confined to the CVM only. 
If aggregation of household preferences for a public 
project is done by simply adding up the WTPs and 
WTAs of all households affected by this project and 
if the stated WTP of the members of large families as 
compared to the members of small families with the 
same household income and the same preferences of 
household members has to be smaller because the 
same budget constraint is more restrictive for large 
households than for small households this procedure 
implies a discrimination against the members of large 
households. It means that their “vote” in terms of stated 
WTP has less weight in the aggregation procedure 
than the vote of smaller households, all other things 
being equal. The fact that households with equal 
preferences and equal household income are treated 
differently in such valuation studies violates the prin-
ciple of horizontal equity according to which equals 
have to be treated equally (cf. e.g. Slemrod and Yitz-
haki, 2002, p. 445). In order to reduce this household-
size bias of contingent valuation results we suggest 
considering household size explicitly in valuation 
studies by using household equivalence scales for the 
aggregation of household WTPs.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the 
first section we highlight the theoretical background 
of aggregation in environmental valuation analyses 
and show that WTP has to decrease with freely dis-
posable income. This is the source of implausible 
results if household WTPs instead of individual 
WTPs are aggregated. In section 2 we discuss the 
theoretical concept of equivalence scales and their 
possible integration in environmental valuation 
studies. In section 3 we illustrate the practical appli-
cation of equivalence scales empirically using a 
practical example of a contingent valuation study. 
The final section offers some concluding remarks. 
1. Project appraisal  
In this section we contrast the theoretical back-
ground of environmental valuation with the practice 
of project appraisal to show where the common 
aggregation procedure leads to a deviation from 
what theory demands.  
2.1. Individual welfare measurement. The as-
sessment of individual welfare effects of an envi-
ronmental project aims at the identification of the 
individual utility changes caused by this project 
( ) ( )1 0 1 1 1 0– ,    ,  j j j j jU = U  U = uj x z uj x zΔ − ,              (1) 
where the index j denotes individuals j ∈{1, 2, ..., J} 
and 0jU  and 
1
jU  denote the utility levels attained by an 
individual j before (situation 0) and after (situation 1) 
the project has been accomplished. The function uj(⋅) 
is the individual’s direct utility function, xj ∈ ℜN is 
the vector of market commodities consumed by indi-
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vidual j and z ∈ ℜM is a vector of parameters de-
scribing the state of the environment, e.g. water or air 
quality, the number of different species in a certain 
area, the number of services provided by a certain 
ecosystem etc.  
Since utility changes cannot be observed directly 
ΔUj is typically measured by the Hicksian Compen-
sating Variation (HCV). If we focus on the envi-
ronmental effects of a public project and assume 
prices and income to be constant, the Hicksian 
Compensating Variation for an individual j can be 
described indirectly by the identity: 
vj ( p, z1, Ij – HCVj) ≡ vj ( p, z0, Ij)  = 0jU ,                  (2) 
where vj (⋅) is the jth individual’s indirect utility 
function. Alternatively the Hicksian Compensating 
Variation can be defined directly by the identity  
HCVj (p, z1, 0 ,jU
1
jU ) ≡ ej (p, z1, 1jU ) – ej (p, z1, 0jU ),   (3) 
where ej (⋅) is the jth individual’s expenditure function. 
From the strict monotonicity of the expenditure func-
tion in utility U it follows that HCV is a reliable wel-
fare indicator in the sense that it is positive for utility 
increases and negative for utility decreases. Within the 
world of ordinal utility the absolute value of the HCV 
is meaningless, it is only its sign that matters. In this 
pure interpretation an aggregation of the HCVs of 
different individuals does not make sense.  
1.2. Aggregation. Nevertheless, in practical cost-
benefit analyses the HCV is typically aggregated 
over all individuals affected by a project. For the 
political decision if this project should be carried out 
or not it is often not enough to assess the individual 
utility effects of that project according to (3), but it 
is also necessary or at least desired by politicians 
that these individual HCVs are aggregated. We 
know that an “objective”, i.e. a non-normative aggre-
gation of individual preferences is not possible un-
der fairly plausible conditions. As a convention the 
Hicks-Kaldor criterion, according to which a public 
project should be accepted as socially beneficial if 
the sum of the individual Hicksian Compensating 
Variations according to 
( )1 1 1 0
1 1
( , , ) ( , , )
J J
j j j j j
j j
HCV e p z U e p z U
= =
= −∑ ∑    (4) 
is positive, is widely accepted in cost-benefit analysis. 
This kind of aggregation is compatible with the 
postulation of a utilitarian welfare function since for 
constant p and constant z the expenditure function is 
a (money-metric) utility function. 
Of course, equation (4) does not represent some ob-
jective form of utility aggregation but corresponds to 
a specific (and in a way arbitrary) distributional 
norm. In the cardinal world of utility aggregation 
according to (4) a positive HCV (WTP) of one indi-
vidual can be overcompensated by the negative HCV 
(WTA) of another individual. Further, if it is to be 
decided which of two alternative projects in two dif-
ferent regions should be realized it might be decisive 
in which region people with higher incomes live be-
cause higher incomes lead to higher WTPs and, 
therewith, to a higher overall social benefit in this 
region according to the aggregation mode (4).  
The reason for this (mostly unwanted) distributional 
effect of government spending is that the HCV in-
creases with income. This can be seen if we substi-
tute the household’s indirect utility function vj (p, z, 
Ij) for the utility levels Uj in (3) so that we obtain the 
“indirect” version of the Hicksian CV as a function of 
p, z and I according to 
( )( )
( )( )
0 1 1 1
1 0
( , , , ) , , , ,
, , , , .
indir
j j j j j
j j j
HCV p z z I e p z v p z I
e p z v p z I
≡ −
−      (5) 
Taking into account the duality identity ej = (p, z, vj (p, 
z, Ij)) ≡ Ij we obtain the first-order derivative of (5) 
with respect to income as 
( )
( )
1 0
0 1
0
, ,
( , , , ) 1
, ,
.
indir
j jj
j
j j
j j
j
e p z UHCV
p z z I
I U
v p z I
I
∂∂ ≡ − ⋅∂ ∂
∂⋅ ∂
.  (6) 
From ej = (p, z, vj (p, z, Ij)) ≡ Ij it follows that the 
derivative of the expenditure function with respect 
to utility at some point [p, z, v (p, z, I)] is reciprocal 
to the derivative of the indirect utility function w.r.t. 
income, so that (6) can be expressed as  
( )
( )
1 0
0 1
0 0
, ,
( , , , ) 1 0.
, ,
j
jindir
j j
j
jj
j
j
e
p z U
HCV U
p z z I eI p z U
U
∂
∂ ∂≡ − >∂∂
∂
    (7) 
Since the expenditure function is strictly monotoni-
cally decreasing in environmental quality, for an  
environmental improvement it holds that under the 
assumption of a decreasing marginal utility of in-
come its reciprocal, i.e. the “marginal cost of utility” 
/j je U∂ ∂ , must be greater for ( )0 0, ,j je p z U  than 
for ( )1 0, ,j je p z U . From (7) it follows then that 
under the conventional assumption of a decreas-
ing marginal utility of income the Hicksian Com-
pensating Variation increases with disposable 
income.  
In an ordinal world where only the sign and not the 
absolute value of the HCV is considered this rela-
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tion between HCV and income does not matter, but 
as soon as we start to aggregate the individual 
HCVs according to (4), the interests of persons with 
higher disposable incomes are more effectively rep-
resented in cost-benefit analyses than the interests of 
individuals with low incomes and the same prefer-
ence ordering. 
1.3. Project appraisal on a household basis. The 
Contingent Valuation method is an interview-based 
valuation technique. In the center of a CVM inter-
view is the elicitation question where respondents’ 
WTP for the project is assessed. In a typical CVM 
survey a representative random sample of all house-
holds potentially affected by a public project is drawn 
for the interviews. Then a randomly chosen member 
of each of the selected households is interviewed and 
she or he is asked (among other things) the whole 
household’s WTP for the project in question. This 
implies that the final decision if a certain environ-
mental project should be implemented or not, is made 
after a two-stage aggregation process. On the first 
stage the individual preferences of the members of a 
single household are aggregated (at least implicitly) 
by the household member who is asked the house-
hold’s WTP in a CVM interview, and then on the 
second stage the WTPs of all households are aggre-
gated by the researchers in order to obtain a social 
WTP for the public project in question.  
This procedure leads to two different aggregation 
problems arising in the context of a contingent valua-
tion study. One problem is the problem of intra-
household utility aggregation mentioned above. This 
refers to the question of how the preferences of differ-
ent household members should be aggregated so that a 
single WTP for a public project can be elicited. Munro 
(2009, p. 5) or Lindhjem and Navrud (2009, p. 11) find 
that most papers reporting the results of empirical 
CVM studies are rather hazy regarding the kind of 
elicitation question that should be asked: should re-
spondents answer the WTP question as individuals 
or as households? In most studies, however, it is at 
least implicitly assumed that the randomly chosen 
household member who is interviewed should state 
the WTP of the whole household for the environ-
mental project in question. The theoretical back-
ground of this practice is the unitary household 
model according to which a household can be 
treated as if there is a single agent in each household 
maximizing a single (unitary) household utility 
function. This model presupposes income pooling 
which implies that for a household’s consumption 
decisions only the amount of aggregate household 
income matters while the source of income is irrele-
vant for the household decisions. In this case it does 
not matter which household member is interviewed 
in a CVM survey because the stated WTP for a pub-
lic project will always be the same. Ion Strand 
(2007) shows in a theoretical household bargaining 
model that the WTP for a public good stated by an 
arbitrary household member on behalf of the whole 
household is the same as the sum of the individual 
WTPs of all household members if the marginal 
valuation of that public good is the same for all 
household members. Ebert and Moyes (2009) ana-
lyze household decision making also on the basis of 
a game-theoretical household model and show that 
the outcome of an intra-household decision process 
depends decisively on the degree of cooperation 
between the different household members.  
Empirical evidence does not support the unitary 
household model. Empirical studies show that in prac-
tice individual consumption or valuation decisions 
made separately by household members on behalf of 
the whole household depend on the person who makes 
the decision. Bateman and Munro (2005) find in an 
experimental study with couples that risky choices for 
the couple have different outcomes depending on who 
makes the choice: the husband, the wife or both to-
gether. This result is confirmed by another empirical 
study by Bateman and Munro (2009) where they find 
in a series of choice experiments that the health risks 
accruing from pesticides and fat in food are valued 
differently depending on which household member is 
asked. In a split-sample CVM study Lindhjelm and 
Navrud (2009) ask individual household members 
their valuation of a biodiversity preservation project in 
Norway from their own individual perspective and 
from the household perspective. They find that indi-
vidual valuation is not much different from household 
valuation if the respective answers are compared be-
tween the two samples. But they also find that in the 
same sample stated household WTP is much higher 
than individual WTP if respondents are first asked 
their individual WTP and then their WTP on behalf of 
the whole household.  
These empirical results show that the common practice 
of aggregating household WTPs instead of individual 
WTPs leads to biased results and needs some addi-
tional considerations: firstly, we cannot be sure that 
respondents in CVM interviews aggregate the prefer-
ences of the different household members correctly 
and, secondly, even if the respondent aggregates the 
WTP of the individual household members correctly, 
their WTP is restricted by the common household 
budget constraint that is the tighter the more people 
live in the household, other things being equal.  
1.4. Distributional consequences. In practical cost-
benefit analyses in the environmental sector only the 
benefits accruing from a public project are assessed 
in household interviews since households typically 
benefit from environmental projects, while they do 
not see the project costs. Therefore, project costs, 
Environmental Economics, Volume 4, Issue 1, 2013 
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which are typically based on market prices (like the 
cost of capital, materials and labor), are assessed 
separately from the benefits which are measured in 
terms of households’ willingness to pay for the reali-
zation of such a project.  
Practical project assessment studies, therefore, fol-
low the decision rule that a public project should be 
realized if the benefits as measured by the sum of 
the affected households’ willingness to pay for the 
project WTPh exceed the project costs C: 
1
0
0
0
,
H
h
h
accept
WTP C either accept or reject
reject
project for implementation
=
> ⇒
− = ⇒
< ⇒
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞ ⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑   (8) 
where h is the index denoting households 
h = 1, 2, …, H. As mentioned before empirical studies 
like e.g. Whitehead (1991), Whittington et al. 
(1992), McDaniels et al. (1992), Garrod and Willis 
(1994), Johannesson et al. (1996), Chambers et al. 
(1998), Roschewitz (1999), Hammit et al. (2001), 
Liu et al. (2003), Ahlheim et al. (2004), Dong et al. 
(2004), Aprahamian et al. (2007) show that in prac-
tice stated household WTPh is often negatively cor-
related with household size. This implies that the 
chances for the realization of a project are the worse 
the more large-size households are among the sup-
porters of the project. If the decision is between two 
alternative projects the project with a higher number 
of small-size households (other things being equal) 
stands a better chance of being selected for imple-
mentation even if a smaller number of people might 
be concerned by this project. Therefore, with the 
implementation rule (8) which is typically used in 
environmental valuation studies large households 
have more problems to get projects realized that are 
in their interest than small-size households with the 
same income and preferences.  
Since one cannot reasonably expect that the aggre-
gate appreciation of an environmental project is 
lower in many-person households than in house-
holds with less members the only plausible expla-
nation for this negative correlation is that house-
hold WTP of large-size households is more re-
stricted by the household budget than the WTP of 
small-size households other things being equal. 
This would not pose a problem from a theoretical 
as well as a political point of view if everybody 
could freely choose in which kind of household he 
wants to live and if he could correct this choice at 
any time. Then the choice of the household a per-
son lives in (and its size) could be regarded as re-
flecting her preferences like any other consumption 
decision does. In reality this is typically not the 
case, not for the children and often also not for the 
adults. Therefore, family size for many people is a 
kind of “fate” and this fate decides on the effective-
ness with which people’s preferences for some pub-
lic good are represented and considered in a house-
hold-based valuation study.  
The question whether this constitutes a problem or not, 
is a political as well as an ethical question. Environ-
mental valuation studies provide the scientific basis for 
political decisions regarding the allocation of public 
funds. Since these allocation decisions are also deci-
sions with respect to the distribution of the benefits 
accruing from these public funds questions of equity 
and distributional justice cannot be neglected here. For 
consistency as well as distributional reasons we sug-
gest including household equity considerations explic-
itly in decisions on the realization of public projects, 
especially in the environmental sector. Since environ-
mental decisions are oriented towards the future and 
the wellbeing of future generations, especially in this 
context a discrimination of families with many chil-
dren seems to be rather unfortunate. Therefore, we 
suggest using a weighted sum of household WTPs 
instead of (8) for the cost-benefit comparison, where 
household equivalence scales serve as welfare weights. 
Such a weighted aggregation of household WTP 
would lead to a more equal treatment of different 
households with different household size.  
2. Enhancing the validity of CVM studies by 
using equivalence scales  
Equivalence scales are well-known from the litera-
ture on poverty lines and the assessment of welfare 
payments (cf. e.g. Takeda, 2010; Dagum and Fer-
rari, 2004; Browning, 1992). Equivalence scales are 
also considered in the context of taxation because 
they are regarded suitable to meet the requirements 
of horizontal equity there (cf. e.g. Lambert, 2004). 
Horizontal equity in taxation refers to “…the idea that 
equals should be treated equally by the tax system, 
or that tax liability should not depend on any of a set 
of irrelevant characteristics” (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 
2002, p. 445). Lambert (2004, p. 76) states: “It has 
become conventional to apply an equivalence scale 
to determine the equals at the family level”. This is 
exactly what is needed for an adequate aggregation 
of household WTPs: identifying “equals” and giving 
them equal opportunities to feed their preferences 
for a public project into the decision rule (8). “Irrele-
vant characteristics” (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002, p. 
445) like the size of the family they happen to be 
born into should not be an obstacle to their influence 
on that decision. Equity in the context of environ-
mental valuation, therefore, refers to people’s influ-
ence on the decision if a specific environmental 
project should be realized or not, or which of several 
Environmental Economics, Volume 4, Issue 1, 2013 
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alternative projects should be carried out. Our sug-
gestion is to give households with equal preferences 
and equal household income but different size the 
opportunity to state equal WTPs for a specific envi-
ronmental project. For this purpose the households’ 
stated WTPs should be weighted by suitable equiva-
lence scales in order to make their stated WTPs 
compatible with each other. This aggregation proce-
dure would lead to a modified decision rule 
1
0
0
0
H
h h
h
accept
S WTP C either accept or reject
reject
=
> ⇒
⋅ − = ⇒
< ⇒
⎧⎪⎛ ⎞⎨⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎪⎩
∑ ,  (9) 
where Sh is the equivalence scale of a household h.  
Studies on the different “welfare potential” of the same 
income for different households with different socio-
economic characteristics have a long tradition going 
back as far as the end of the nineteenth century to the 
work of Engel (1883 and 1895) whose equivalence 
scale concept serves as a reference for more modern 
concepts even today. Engel used the food-
expenditure shares of different household groups as 
welfare weights in order to make households of dif-
ferent size and composition comparable with each 
other. While Engel’s equivalence scales follow mere 
statistical concept later approaches to the equivalence 
scale problem were more sophisticated and typically 
based on neoclassical household theory. Especially, 
the papers of Prais and Houthakker (1955), Barten 
(1964), Kapteyn and van Praag (1976), Lewbel 
(1989), Blundell and Lewbel (1991), Muellbauer 
(1974, 1977, 1980) set further landmarks in this field 
of research. Here the question what incomes would 
be needed to achieve a certain level of household 
utility with different household sizes and composi-
tions stands in the center of interest. Several concepts 
of equivalence scales have emerged over the years 
(for an overview see e.g. Dagum and Ferrari (2004)). 
The extensive literature on the empirical measure-
ment of equivalence scales covers a variety of ap-
proaches (cf., Ray 1986). Well-known concepts stem 
from, among others, van Praag (1968 and 1991), 
Kapteyn (1994) or Steward (2009). For equivalence 
scales based on Russian data see Takeda (2010), for 
Dutch data see Melenberg and van Soest (1995) and 
for an application to German data Charlier (2002).  
The general idea which is common to the various con-
cepts of household equivalence scales is that the ma-
terial needs of a household depend, among other 
things, on its demographic characteristics, especially 
on its size and composition. Households with different 
demographic characteristics need different amounts of 
income to attain a given utility level or standard of 
living, even if preferences are equal. Analogously, the 
same income generates different degrees of satisfac-
tion for households with different demographic charac-
teristics and equal preferences. A household equiva-
lence scale is “... a budget deflator which reflects 
household needs”, as Muellbauer (1980, p. 154) puts it. 
Or, more precisely: “Equivalence scales are to welfare 
comparisons across households with different charac-
teristics what cost of living indices are to welfare com-
parisons for a given household facing different prices” 
(Muellbauer, 1980, p. 155).  
In analogy to the individual expenditure function 
used in (3) we may define a household conditional 
expenditure function (see e.g. Pollak and Wales, 
1979, p. 217) as:  
e (p, z, W, δ) ≡ min p⋅x, s. t. w (x, z, δ) ≥ W,             (10) 
where W is the household utility level defined by the 
(unitary) household utility function W = w(x, z, δ) 
( )( )1 1 2 2( , ), ( , ), ..., ( , ),F Fw u x z u x z u x z δ≡ ?  with 
1
F
f
f
x x
=
= ∑ . 
The number of family members is F and δ is a vec-
tor of demographic household parameters like the 
number of adults, number of children etc. Since this 
unitary kind of household model is assumed in most 
practical valuation studies at least implicitly and 
since we do not want to interfere with the discussion 
on intra-household aggregation in this paper we will 
build our further argumentation here on this model.  
From equation (10) we can derive the definition of 
conditional equivalence scales1. A standard or refer-
ence household with two adults and no kids is de-
fined and all other households are regarded in rela-
tion to this reference household. Then an equiva-
lence scale Sh for a demographic household group h 
expresses the ratio between the minimum expenditure 
a household from this group has to make in order to 
realize a certain level of satisfaction on the one hand 
and the respective expenditures of the reference 
household on the other (cf. also Deaton and Muell-
bauer, 1980, p. 205; or Takeda, 2010, p. 352): 
( , , , )( , , , , )
( , , , )
h
h r
h r
e p z WS S p z W
e p z W
δδ δ δ= ⋅        
{ }( )1, 2, ..., ,h H∈                                                   (11) 
where the functional forms of the expenditure func-
tions for household h and for the reference house-
hold r are the same since, typically, all households 
are assumed to have the same preference ordering2 
and differ only in the demographic parameters δ. 
Obviously, for the reference household r it holds 
that Sr = S (p, z, W, δ r, δ r) ≡ 1.  
                                                     
1 As mentioned before there are many different definitions and concepts 
of equivalence scales in the literature. For an overview see e.g. Dagum 
and Ferrari (2004). 
2 The implications of the assumption of identical preferences across all 
households have been extensively analyzed by Fisher (1987). 
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Since the household utility level W cannot be as-
sessed directly it is typically expressed by the indi-
rect household utility function v (p, z, I) so that the 
equivalence scale Sh becomes  
( ) ( )( )
{ }( )
ˆ , , , , , , , , , , ,
1, 2, ..., .
h r h r
hS S p z I S p z v p z I
h H
δ δ δ δ= ≡
∈   (12) 
The dependence of the equivalence scale on prices 
and income is usually interpreted as a dependence 
on real income ˆ ˆ/I I p= , where pˆ  is some cost-of 
living index.  
Assuming that the WTP stated by the reference house-
hold r is a reliable indicator for its utility gain resulting 
from an environmental project (i.e. neglecting the 
intra-household aggregation problem here) we suggest 
correcting the WTP stated by other households with 
different household sizes using an appropriate equiva-
lence scale Sh in order to assess their “true” benefits Bh 
received from the project in question: 
{ }( )1, 2, ..., .h h hB S WTP h H= × ∈                        (13) 
This up- or down-scaling of the WTP stated by a 
household h corresponds with endowing this house-
hold with a virtual income that would enable this 
household to state the same WTP as the reference 
household r (cf. Ahlheim, 1998). Correcting stated 
WTP through equivalence scales which leads to 
scale-corrected household benefits Bh is a pragmatic 
way of avoiding the problems associated with the 
empirical assessment of virtual incomes.  
The revised social value of some environmental 
project as needed in (9) would then be 
1 1
H H
social
h h h
h h
B B S WTP
= =
= = ⋅∑ ∑
                                
(14) 
instead of the unweighted sum of household WTPs 
according to (8). In practice, however, not every 
household potentially affected by a public project 
can be interviewed. As explained before, typically a 
representative random sample of households is cho-
sen for the CVM interviews and the mean household 
WTP calculated from this sample is then extrapo-
lated to the set of all households concerned (for the 
problems arising from this aggregation procedure 
see e.g. Bateman and Munro (2006). The weighted 
aggregation mode (14) has, therefore, to be applied 
to the different socio-demographic groups contained 
in the chosen household sample.  
Since the questionnaire of a CVM survey typically 
contains questions with respect to the demographic 
characteristics of the households, it can be seen how 
many one-person, two-person, three-person etc. 
households are in a household sample. If we define 
K different demographic groups k (k = 1, 2, ..., K) in 
a sample of H  households we can assign suitable 
equivalence scales Sk to each household group k, so 
that all households in a group k obtain the same 
equivalence scale Sk. If the number of households in 
a demographic group k is Nk, the mean WTP of this 
group is denoted by kWTP  and the number of all 
households potentially affected by a project is H we 
can calculate the “sample”-version of the social bene-
fits accruing from this project as: 
1
K
social sample
k k k
k
HB WTP S N
H =
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅∑ .                     (15) 
This aggregation procedure means a break with the 
simplifying “a dollar is a dollar”-principle prevailing 
in traditional cost-benefit analysis and a step to-
wards a more sophisticated valuation of environ-
mental changes where the different demographic 
characteristics of households are considered expli-
citly and the discrimination of the members of 
large households is reduced. Scale correction of 
household WTP in environmental valuation does 
not mean the solution to all our problems, but it 
constitutes an important step in the right direction.  
Correcting household WTP for household size di-
rectly by multiplying stated WTP by a suitable 
equivalence scale is, of course, only one possibility 
to deal with the problem of different household sizes. 
Another possibility would be to first correct house-
hold income using equivalence scales and then feed 
this corrected virtual income into the equation for 
the estimation of WTP as a function of various 
household data one of which being income1. 
One problem when applying the equivalence scale 
approach in practice is the choice of the equivalence 
scale to be used in a concrete CVM study. Obvious-
ly, there is no unique “scientifically correct” way of 
computing equivalence scales Sk. Since aggregation 
of individual preference orderings is not possible on 
an objective, purely scientific basis all kinds of ag-
gregation are normative and somehow arbitrary in 
the end. Ideally, an equivalence scale would take on 
the general form (11) but we know that it is difficult 
to assess empirically the values of the expenditure 
function needed for the computation of Sk according 
to (11). The main problem here is to assess a value 
for the household utility level W in (11). One class 
of studies relies on self-reported utility or wellbeing 
which is then used to estimate the equivalence 
scales econometrically based on household data (see 
e.g. Steward, 2009; Takeda, 2010; or Balli and 
                                                     
1 This approach was followed by Carlsson et al. (2004, p. 156). 
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Tiezzi, 2010). There are other, more pragmatic ver-
sions of equivalence scales proposed in the litera-
ture, some of which will be discussed in the next 
section. It is also clear that the absolute value of 
equivalence scales depends among other things on 
the choice of the reference household. For most 
equivalence scales a two-adult household is chosen 
as a reference household for which the respective 
equivalence scale is set equal to 1. Nevertheless, 
other choices might appear plausible as well.  
3. The effect of the use of equivalence scales  
on CVM results  
In this section we demonstrate the effect of house-
hold equivalence scales on the results of practical 
CVM surveys in an empirical example (for details 
of the underlying valuation project cf. Ahlheim et 
al., 2004)1. We apply this scale correction procedure 
to stated household WTP in a contingent valuation 
study carried out in Eastern Germany (cf. Ahlheim 
et al. (2004)) and show how the results of the study 
respond to the use of different forms of equivalence 
scales. The aim of the study was to assess the social 
benefits accruing from the reclamation of a former 
open-pit mining area close to the city of Cottbus, 
which lies 120 kilometers south-east of Berlin. In 
this lignite pit near Cottbus mining activities will 
end by the year 2015. At this time the mining com-
pany will stop pumping off the groundwater so that 
it will rise to its original level and the former pit will 
be turned into a lake with a recreation area around it 
and also a small nature reserve. 
For the assessment of the benefits accruing from this 
reclamation project a contingent valuation study was 
carried out in 2003. In this study more than 1,000 
households were interviewed. Their willingness to pay 
for the realization of this rehabilitation project was 
elicited using the double-bounded dichotomous choice 
question format2. The results are shown in Table 1. 
Based on a logit model, the average household wil-
lingness to pay for the Cottbus Lake turned out to be 
4.39 Euro per month (with a 95% confidence interval 
between 3.45 and 5.23 Euro per month).  
The city of Cottbus and the surrounding communi-
ties have roughly 100,000 people that live in 50,899 
households. This yields an aggregate willingness to 
pay for the population affected by the rehabilitation 
project of ca. 223,000 Euro per month or 2.68 mln. 
                                                     
1 This numerical example is taken from an unpublished discussion paper 
(Ahlheim and Lehr, 2008). We are grateful to Ulrike Lehr who made the 
calculations cited in this section. 
2 This rise in the cost of living was explained to the respondents as a conse-
quence of the fact that the project would have to be financed by the commu-
nities in this area which in turn will raise their communal taxes, fees etc. 
These increases in costs will be passed on by shop owners or house owners 
to their customers or tenants giving rise to a general increase in prices and 
the cost of living in this area. 
Euro per year as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Average household WTP and  
aggregate WTP for the “Cottbus Lake” 
 Logit model 
Average household WTP 4.39 Euro / month 
Aggregate WTP 2.68 mln. Euro / year 
Source: Ahlheim and Lehr (2008). 
Table 2 shows the sign of the coefficients for some 
potential determinants of willingness to pay with 
household size being one of them (for the details of 
the underlying contingent valuation study (see Ahl-
heim et al., 2004). While the education level and 
household income have a positive effect on stated 
willingness to pay, age and the distance from people’s 
homes to the lake have a negative effect. As expected 
from our earlier discussion, household size has a nega-
tive effect on willingness to pay. Most of these effects 
are plausible, only the fact that household size should 
have a negative effect on households’ willingness to 
pay for the proposed rehabilitation project does not 
make sense. In larger households typically more child-
ren are living than in smaller households, and it is 
especially the younger people who will be able to en-
joy the benefits accruing from the new lake, since 
these benefits will be available only in the far future 
(as viewed from 2003 when the survey was con-
ducted). Therefore, large households should have a 
higher household willingness to pay for the rehabilita-
tion project than small household because more 
household members will receive benefits from the 
project and part of them will also enjoy these benefits 
longer than the members of small households since 
they are children now and will live longer after the 
rehabilitation process will have been accomplished 
and the lake will be ready for utilization.  
Table 2. The effects of some determinants  
on willingness to pay 
 Sign p-value 
Age - 0.028 
Monthly income + 0.000 
Education level + 0.195 
Household size - 0.025 
Distance to the lake (in travel time 
classes) - 0.006 
Gender (1 = female, 0 = male) + 0.041 
Constant + 0.029 
Bid - 0.000 
Source: Ahlheim and Lehr (2008). 
In this basic version of the model the aggregate wil-
lingness to pay for the realization of the proposed 
reclamation project was calculated without consid-
eration of household size or household composition. 
In a next step we shall analyze the effect of an ex-
plicit consideration of different versions of house-
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hold equivalence scales on our results. The distribu-
tion of different family sizes in the research area is 
stated in Table 3. It can be seen that in more than 
36% of all households in the Cottbus area more than 
two persons were living at the time when the survey 
was conducted.  
Table 3. Distribution of family size in Cottbus 
(2004, in percent) 
Number of 
household 
members 
1 2 3 4 5 
 18.44% 46.25% 20.32% 12.33% 4.25% 
Source: Ahlheim and Lehr (2008). 
In our section 2 the concept of equivalence scales 
based on neoclassical household theory was dis-
cussed in detail. The empirical assessment of 
equivalence scales is still under debate among 
economists (cf. e.g. Schulte (2007), but also Stew-
ard (2009), Takeda (2010) or Balli and Tiezzi 
(2010)). For practical applications the literature 
often suggests the use of expert scales or survey 
approaches (for the latter see Charlier (2002) or 
Schwarze (2003)). Survey-based approaches which 
rely on self-reportetd household satisfaction levels 
were already popular in the 1970s with the so-called 
Leyden School (van Praag and Kapteyn, 1973) but 
are still under discussion today (see e.g. Steward 
(2009) or Takeda (2010)).  
Expert scales are the most widely used scales in 
practical applications, and the OECD scales are the 
most prominent examples (see also Biewen, 2000). 
Table 4 gives an overview over the range of equiva-
lence scales for Germany and compares them to the 
OECD scales. As can be seen from Table 4 the 
amount of equivalence scales for a one-adult house-
hold is typically not just half the amount of the 
equivalence scales for a two-adult household but 
higher. This reflects the fact that two adults living 
together can realize economies of scale regarding 
their cost of living, so that with the same household 
income they can realize a higher standard of living 
than a one-adult household with half that income. 
Table 4. Equivalence scales for Germany  
Number of 
household 
members 
1 3 4 5 6 
Charlier 0.7 1.2 1.3 1.42 1.54 
Missong 0.6 1.28 1.43 1.54  
OECD (modif.) 0.67 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 
OECD (old) 0.59 1.29 1.59 1.88 2.18 
Praag 0.83 1.12 1.21 1.29 1.35 
Schröder 0.67 1.15 1.28 1.41  
Schwarze 0.79 1.15 1.26 1.37  
Social 0.56 1.36 1.72 2.08 2.44 
Assistance 
Notes: A childless couple is the reference household with an 
equivalence scale of 1.00. 
Source: Schulte (2007). 
Table 4 does not account for the age of household 
members, especially of children, but we consider this 
in our calculations presented in Table 5. In Table 5 
the equivalence scales from Table 4 are used to cor-
rect the stated WTP of the different household groups 
for household size. It shows that the use of equiva-
lence scales increase the total benefits from the rec-
lamation project under consideration from 2.68 mil-
lion Euro up to over 3 million Euro per year. This 
increase of the social value of the project by more 
than 300,000 Euro per year (or nearly 12%) as com-
pared to the unscaled result is quite impressive. It 
gives us an indication of the considerable effect the 
use of equivalence scales could have on valuation 
studies carried out in developing countries where 
large families are far more common than in Germany.  
These results show that the use of equivalence 
scales has changed the original non-scaled results 
substantially. This was to be expected since in our 
research site many households with children and 
tight budgets could be found, like also in the rest of 
Eastern Germany at that time. Therefore, the ad-
justment of WTP to household size as shown in 
Table 5 lead to considerable changes in the total 
social value of the proposed reclamation project. 
One can also see from Table 5 that the choice of the 
equivalence scale has a considerable influence on 
the survey results. Unfortunately, there are no clear-
cut rules for a suitable choice of equivalence scales 
for such studies which would make things easier. 
Therefore, also the explicit consideration of house-
hold size and composition in CVM studies leaves us 
with a rest of uncertainty which kind of adjustment 
of our survey results would lead us to the “correct” 
results. This has to be considered especially when 
interpreting CVM results or explaining their impor-
tance to politicians or government officials.  
Table 5. Mean willingness to pay adjusted  
with equivalence scales in € 
Number of household 
members WTP/ average household Total WTP 
Charlier 4.58 2,800,614 
Missong 4.61 2,816,776 
OECD (modif.) 4.64 2,835,498 
OECD (old) 4.80 2,934,793 
Praag 4.55 2,777,772 
Schröder 4.45 2,721,712 
Schwarze 4.53 2,771,584 
Social Assistance 4.94 3,020,152 
Source: Ahlheim and Lehr (2008). 
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Concluding remarks 
Our main concern in this paper is the fact that in 
standard cost-benefit analyses based on contingent 
valuation surveys a systematic discrimination of 
households with many household members can be 
observed. The reason for this “household size bias” of 
CVM results is that the absolute value of the Hick-
sian Compensating Variation (which is equivalent to 
the willingness to pay for utility-enhancing public 
projects) decreases as the freely disposable income 
of a household decreases. Since the political deci-
sion if a certain project should be realized or not 
depends on the sum of the WTPs of all households 
affected by this project, the influence of many-
person households on this decision is smaller than 
the influence of small households with the same  
 
gross income and the same household preferences, 
since a smaller part of their income is freely dispos-
able and their budget constraint is more “biting”. Es-
pecially in the context of environmental projects this 
is very unfortunate since large households are typi-
cally large because they have many children who 
might enjoy improved environmental quality in the 
future. Their preferences are not adequately consi-
dered in the decision rule used in conventional cost-
benefit analyses. Therefore, we recommend using 
household equivalence scales as welfare weights in 
the Hicks-Kaldor criterion to adjust contingent valu-
ation results to household size and to protect espe-
cially the interests of children in the political deci-
sion process based on environmental cost-benefit 
analyses. 
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